When Administrative Law Judges Rule the World: Wooley v. State Farm - Does a Denial of Agency-Initiated Judicial Review of ALJ Final Orders Violate the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers? by Rolen-Ogden, April
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 3
10-15-2006
When Administrative Law Judges Rule the World:
Wooley v. State Farm - Does a Denial of Agency-
Initiated Judicial Review of ALJ Final Orders
Violate the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation
of Powers?
April Rolen-Ogden
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Judges Commons,
and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary by an authorized administrator of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Kevin.Miller3@pepperdine.edu.
Recommended Citation
April Rolen-Ogden, When Administrative Law Judges Rule the World: Wooley v. State Farm - Does a Denial of Agency-Initiated Judicial
Review of ALJ Final Orders Violate the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers?, 26 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L. Judiciary Iss. 2 (2006)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol26/iss2/3
WHEN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES RULE
THE WORLD:
Wooley v. State Farm - Does A Denial Of Agency-
Initiated Judicial Review Of ALJ Final Orders Violate
The Constitutional Doctrine Of Separation Of Powers?
April Rolen-Ogden
I. The Origins and Trends of Modem Administrative Law
A. The Origins and Development of the Traditional APA
B. Three Different Models of Administrative Adjudication
C. The Trend Towards Central Panels
II. Louisiana's APA and the Wooley v. State Farm Conundrum
A. Louisiana's APA
1. Creation of Louisiana's Central Panel
2. Legislative Preclusion of Agency-Initiated Judicial
Review
B. The Wooley v. State Farm Conundrum
1. The Facts and Procedural History in Brown and in
Wooley
2. The Trial Court's Oral Reasons for Judgment
3. The Louisiana Supreme Court Speaks
4. The Louisiana Legislature Reacts
III. Analysis of Louisiana's APA and the Constitutional Doctrine
of Separation of Powers
A. Infringement on the Judicial Branch
1. Crucial Check on Executive Branch Obliterated
2. Divestiture of Jurisdiction of Article V Courts and
Agency Appeals
3. Divestiture of the Judiciary's Inherent Authority to
Decide Questions of Law
B. Infringement on the Executive Branch
1. The COI's Core Function and Delegated Duty
2. Agencies as "Persons" Entitled to Judicial Review
IV. Comparative Analysis Between Louisiana and the Carolinas
* Indicates page numbering from journal of original publication -
66 Louisiana Law Review 885 (2006).
430 / 886* Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 26-2
A. South Carolina's APA - Extreme, But Not as Extreme as
Louisiana
B. North Carolina's APA - The Model of Compromise for
Other States
V. Proposals for a Constitutionally Sound LAPA
VI. Conclusion
As one scholar wisely noted, "at the very minimum, the
availability of agency-initiated judicial review seems implicit to a
constitutional scheme of ALJ finality."' Louisiana is the only state in
the nation with an Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter APA)
specifically precluding agency-initiated judicial review of ALJ final
orders. In Wooley v. State Farm,2 the Louisiana Supreme Court faced
the issue of whether or not such an administrative scheme comports
with the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Depending
on the court's ultimate conclusion, the Louisiana Legislature would
either be praised for its ingenuity or chastised for substituting
efficiency for inherent principles. This case will be analyzed and
followed very closely by administrative and constitutional scholars,
lawyers, and legislators around the country because Louisiana's
unique APA places it on the brink of the modem administrative state.
The Louisiana Supreme Court ultimately held that both
amendments to Louisiana's APA are constitutional.3 It is the
contention of this comment that a proper analysis in Wooley required
1. Jim Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible: Recognizing Problems with AL]
Finality, 56 Admin. L. Rev. 53, 66 (2004) [hereinafter Rossi, Final, But Often
Fallible].
2. This matter was directly appealed from the District Court to the Louisiana
Supreme Court, so there is no appellate court citation. See District Court Opinion in
the Wooley v. State Farm Case, No. 502-311, available at
http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/la/briefs/statefarm_dc.htm (last visited Sept. 15,
2005)(hereinafter Wooley District Court Opinion).
3. Wooley v. State Farm, 04-0882 (La. 1/19/2005), 893 So.2d 746, 772
(hereinafter Wooley State Supreme Court Decision).
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a ruling that the denial of agency-initiated judicial review in a central
panel system with AU finality is unconstitutional because it
impermissibly infringes on both the judicial and executive branches.
Yet, the court correctly determined that there is nothing
unconstitutional about the creation of Louisiana's central panel,
which grants ALJs final order authority.
Agencies must be afforded some mechanism to perform their
delegated duty to make and enforce law and policy, while respecting
the fairness concerns of regulated entities and individuals. This
comment illustrates the detrimental effect of focusing too much
power in the ALJs with no opportunity for judicial review when the
ALJs rule against the agencies involved. Also, this comment offers a
critique on the court's rationales and ultimate decision, while
simultaneously analyzing issues that were either not brought to the
attention of the court, missed, or ignored by the court in Wooley. In
an attempt to correct the damage wreaked by this decision, this
comment explores two other states' APAs and their solutions to the
issues presented. A constitutional scheme would respect both sides
of this debate by allowing AM finality, while also providing for
agency-initiated judicial review, which encompasses differing
standards of review for issues of fact, issues of law, and issues of
policy.
Section I provides the necessary background information on the
administrative law aspects of this debate, while Section II examines
Louisiana's current APA prior to discussing the Wooley matter in all
its phases. Section III analyzes the constitutionality of Louisiana's
denial of agency-initiated judicial review in a system of ALJ finality.
Section IV engages in a comparative analysis between Louisiana and
the Carolinas to fully comprehend the gravity of the constitutional
concerns at stake. Finally, Section V offers two proposals for a
constitutionally sound APA. Both proposals are equally capable of
success in achieving the worthy goals attempted by the Louisiana
legislature.
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I. THE ORIGINS AND TRENDS OF MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. The Origins and Development of the Traditional Administrative
Procedure Act
Congress and state legislatures alike delegate to administrative
agencies the authority to promulgate, enforce, and interpret
regulations for recently passed statutes. One of the primary vehicles
for exercising this delegated duty includes administrative
adjudications, where agencies often make and enforce law and
policy. Since their inception, administrative agencies have been an
anomaly because of their vast blending of various roles in one entity.
These roles include that of investigator, prosecutor, regulator, and
adjudicator.4
Most states modeled their APAs on the federal APA.5 Prior to the
enactment of the federal APA, the political debate focused on the
degree of division between the agency's traditional regulatory and
adjudicatory functions. 6 As a result, many people advocate reform of
the traditional agency system.7 This reform is usually centered on
separating the adjudicatory function from other agency functions so
the system will be fairer.
Unlike many recent state APA amendments, the federal APA
does not remove administrative adjudications from the agency itself,
despite many unsuccessful attempts at reform. Instead, federal
hearing officers are placed outside of the control of agency officials
4. Jay S. Bybee, Agency Expertise, ALJ Independence, and Administrative
Courts: The Recent Changes in Louisiana's Administrative Procedure Act, 59 La.
L. Rev. 431, 443 (1999) [hereinafter Bybee, Agency Expertise]. at 443.
5. Id. at 434.
6. James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State Administrative Law
Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ Authority and Standards of
Agency Review, 54 Admin. L. Rev. 1355, 1363 (2002) [hereinafter Flanagan,
Redefining the Role].
7. See generally Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The
Role of an Alternative Agency Structure, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 965
(1991)(hereinafter Gifford, Adjudication); See generally F. Scott McCown and
Monica Leo, When Can an Agency Change the Findings or Conclusions of an
ALJ? Part Two, 51 Baylor L. Rev. 63 (1999).
engaged in prosecuting or investigating claims.8 The responsibility of
the federal hearing officers is to make an initial decision, which later
becomes part of the record. It is this record that is submitted for final
review by the agency head or commission.9 With this structure, the
agency is left with the discretion to follow the hearing officers'
recommendation or to make different findings of fact, conclusions of
law, and thus reach a different result than the hearing officer did.' 0
As a result, under the federal APA, the ultimate decision remains
with the agency.
In 1961, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws enacted the Model State Administrative Procedure Act."
The 1961 Model State APA did not address the primary concern of
its federal counterpart regarding the seemingly coercive and
inefficient relationship between agencies and hearing officers.
However, in 1981, a revised APA was issued. 12 This 1981 Model
State APA adopted the prior federal APA standard of allowing the
hearing officer or administrative law judge's (ALJ) decision to be an
initial conclusion for the agency head to consider during his or her
review of the matter.
13
B. Three Different Models ofAdministrative Adjudication
Despite differing terminology used by scholars, there are three
generalized models of administrative adjudication in the several
states.' 4 First, the agency staff approach, which is also known as the
8. Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 6.
9. Id. at 1364; See also Daniel J. Gifford, Adjudication, supra note 7, at 970.
10. See Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 6, at 1364.
11. See Bybee, Agency Expertise, supra note 4, at 444.
12. See Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 6, at 1364.
13. Id. at 1363-64.
14. William B. Swent, South Carolina's ALJ: Central Panel, Administrative
Court, or a Little of Both?, 48 S. C. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1996) (citing Malcolm C. Rich &
Wayne E. Brucar, The Central Panel System for Administrative Law Judges: A
Survey of Seven States 10-11 (1 983))(hereinafter Swent, South Carolina's AI).
See also Rossi, Final But Often Fallible, supra note 1, at 56-58 (citing William R.
Andersen, Judicial Review of State Administrative Action - Designing the Statutory
Framework, 44 Admin. L. Rev. 523, 555 (1992)).
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internal model, renders the ALJs the least amount of decisional
independence. 15 This is because the ALJs are operating entirely
within the agency. The AU decision is merely a suggestion, which is
subject to acceptance or rejection by the agency head or
commission.
16
Second, the central panel approach provides for full separation
between agencies and ALJs. Traditional agency adjudications are not
conducted by the agency involved in the matter; instead, the
adjudications are managed and controlled completely outside of the
agency involved. 17 Central panel systems vary from state to state. As
a generalized notion, a central panel is a non-political, merit-
protected agency that is independent of the various state agencies.,
8
This independence allows the central panel to perform agency
adjudications so that the ALJs will not feel compelled to render
favorable decisions to the agencies involved.
Finally, the "administrative court" model, which is also known as
the external model, is the most controversial approach. ALJs have the
greatest amount of autonomy under this approach because they have
the authority to issue final and immediately appealable decisions., 9
Review of such decisions is not open to the traditional agencies.
Instead, these decisions go directly to a reviewing court in case of
conflict.20 An APA system that grants such AU authority is a system
of "ALJ finality" or "ALJ final order authority." In comparing these
three models, Professor Rossi noted that in contrast to the first two
models, "the agency effectively submits to binding arbitration before
the AL" with this external approach. 21 There are only four states
which utilize this model: Louisiana, Florida, South Carolina, and
Missouri.22
15. Id.
16. See Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible, supra note 1, at 56-57.
17. Id. at 57. See also Swent, South Carolina's ALJ, supra note 14.
18. See Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible, supra note 1, at 57.
19. Id. at 58.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
C. The Trend Towards Central Panels
The concept of central panels in administrative agencies is not as
new and revolutionary as one might think. In 1945, California was
the first state to adopt a central panel for its administrative agencies.23
Nearly forty years later, six other states joined California in adopting
central panels, including Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts,
24Minnesota, New Jersey and Tennessee. By 2002, the total number
of states employing central panels was twenty-five, 25 including
26Louisiana.
There are two major policy reasons for using central panels, both
of which are inherently based upon the structure and nature of
traditional agency adjudications. The first reason is the lack of public
confidence in the administrative adjudication process. 27 This was
certainly an important impetus for the amendments to Louisiana's
APA as noted by LSU Law Professor Paul R. Baier in his amicus
curiae brief to the Louisiana Supreme Court in the Wooley matter.
2 8
Professor Baier argues that the vast blending of the roles of regulator,
investigator, and adjudicator in the agency as one entity leaves the
public with "an impression of bias and unfairness. 29
Concern over this public sentiment of agency bias is strengthened
by Professor Daye's empirical analysis of ALJ decisions and judicial
review in North Carolina prior to the 2000 amendments to its APA.3°
One of his conclusions is that generally individuals do not succeed in
23. Id. at 57.
24. Id.
25. Id.; See also Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 6, at 1357 (In
addition to those listed in the text above, the other states with central panels include
Arizona, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, Washington,
Wisconsin and Wyoming).
26. Id.
27. See Swent, South Carolina's ALI, supra note 14, at 7-8.
28. Brief of Amicus Curiae Paul R. Baier at 13-14, Wooley v. State Farm
(hereinafter Amicus Baier).
29. Id.
30. Charles E. Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, Agencies, and
Courts: An Analytical and Empirical Assessment, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1571, 1577
(2001) [hereinafter Daye, Powers ofAdministrative Law Judges].
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administrative adjudications. 31 This conclusion is based upon the fact
that seventy-six percent of the 3,470 administrative hearings
conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings in North
Carolina from 1985 through 1999 favored the agencies involved.32
Thus, the implication is that when the public participates in the
administrative adjudication process and only succeeds against the
agencies involved twenty-four percent of the time, such a result
discourages the public's confidence to the point of their frustration
rendering them unwilling to even try pressing their case.
Even though this empirical study illustrates an important policy
concern that must be addressed by a fair APA system, there are two
limitations to Professor Daye's study. First, the merits of the
individual cases on which this data is based are not taken into
33
account. As a result, there is no indication as to the number of cases
in which the result against the regulated entity or individual was
correct according to the facts and applicable law. Second, settled
cases are not accounted for in this study.34 Thus, there is no
indication of how such cases would affect the findings of this study.
Despite these minor limitations, however, it is quite clear that the
trend towards central panels is growing because of the public's
perception of the inherent unfairness in traditional agencies' blended
roles, as well as in the agencies having complete control over ALJs.
The second major policy reason for the trend towards central
panels is the need for increased AU independence. These two calls
for reform are closely related in that increased AU independence is
intended to remedy the lack of public confidence. If ALJs are
completely separated from the individual agencies' control, then the
public's perception of fairness improves, while agency bias is
lessened contemporaneously. 35
As a result of the interconnected nature of these two policy
concerns, the Louisiana legislature intended to increase AU
independence as well. As Professor Baier noted, "it is quite plain that
31. Id. at 1615. See also Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State
Administrative Law Judge, supra note 6, at 1391.
32. Id.
33. See Daye, Powers ofAdministrative Law Judges, supra note 30, at 1614.
34. Id.
35. See Flanagan, Redefining the Role, supra note 6, at 1383.
the Louisiana Legislature focused exclusively on creating the
Division of Administrative Law so as to make its administrative law
judges independent of agency control and influence. 36 Thus, many
states, including Louisiana, take these important policy concerns
seriously by incorporating central panels. However, as crucial as
these policy concerns may be, states must be mindful that their state
constitutions are supreme to policy. This may be accomplished by
carefully weighing these policy interests against inherent
constitutional principles.
II. LOUISIANA'S APA AND THE WOOLEY V. STATE FARM CONUNDRUM
A. Louisiana's APA
In order to understand the constitutional concerns presented in
Wooley, one must first be familiar with Louisiana's APA. This
section analyzes the two amendments to Louisiana's APA, which
caused such a stir in the Wooley matter. This section continues by
analyzing the facts of the Brown and Wooley matters, and by
examining the trial court's oral reasons for judgment in Wooley.
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision and rationales are
examined.
1. Creation of Louisiana's Central Panel
In 1967, Louisiana, along with many other states, adopted much
of the 1961 Model State APA.37 As a result, prior to 1995, the
relationship between agencies and ALJs was not addressed.38 As
Professor Bybee points out, "[u]ntil the recent amendments, the
Louisiana APA contained but a single reference to 'administrative
hearing officer'." 39 However, all of this changed in 1995 when the
Louisiana legislature enacted Acts No. 739 (hereinafter DAL
amendment), which created a new Division of Administrative Law
36. See Amicus Baier, supra note 28, at 12.
37. See Bybee, Agency Expertise, supra note 4, at 445.
38. See text accompanying Section IA.
39. See Bybee, Agency Expertise, supra note 4, at 451.
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within the Louisiana Department of Civil Service.4 °
Even though a full examination of the changes effected by this
amendment is beyond the scope of this article,4' one change in
particular merits special attention here. Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:992(B)(2) states, "in an adjudication commenced by the division,
the administrative law judge shall issue the final decision or order,
whether or not on rehearing, and the agency shall have no authority
to override such decision or order."42 With these provisions, the
legislature effectively revoked the agency's right to review On June
29, 2005 following the Supreme Court's decision in Wooley, the
Louisiana legislature amended Revised Statutes 49:992(B)(2) to add
the following sentence: "Upon the issuance of such a final decision
or order, the agency or any official thereof shall comply fully with
the final order or decision of the administrative law judge. ' 43 final
agency decisions. As Professor Bybee observed, "no longer do
agency heads have the ability to reverse - under any circumstances,
with or without explanation - an AL's decision.,
44
As a result, even though agencies are delegated the authority by
the legislature to make law and policy through administrative
adjudications, Louisiana agencies must accept the ALJs' decisions on
law and policy. However, as argued by Professor Baier, "there is
nothing per se unconstitutional about creating the Administrative
Law Division and separating the quasi-judicative from the
administrative within the Executive Branch. 45 This is because
merely transferring adjudicatory power from one executive branch
agency to another does not run afoul of the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. Since it is constitutional for traditional agencies
to exercise adjudicatory power due to the demise of the non-
delegation doctrine in modem administrative law analysis, 46 it is also
40. 1995 La. Acts No. 739, § 2 (codified at La. R.S. 49:991-99 (Supp. 1998)).
See also Id.
41. See generally Bybee, Agency Expertise, supra note 4, at 451-54, for a more
in-depth look at the other changes effected by this amendment.
42. La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (2004) (emphasis added).
43. La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (2005).
44. See Bybee, Agency Expertise, supra note 4, at 455.
45. See Amicus Baier, supra note 28, at 14.
46. McGrath, et al., Project: State Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action, 43
Admin. L. Rev. 571, 571-72 (1991) [hereinafter, McGrath, Project].
constitutional for a newly created central agency to perform the same
power.
2. Legislative Preclusion of Agency-Initiated Judicial Review
Constitutional concerns may not arise with the DAL amendment;
however, the same cannot be said of the second amendment. In 1999,
the Louisiana Legislature amended Louisiana Revised Statutes
49:992(B)(3) by enacting Acts No. 1332 (hereinafter Judicial Review
amendment), which states: "however, no agency or official thereof,
or other person acting on behalf of an agency or official thereof, shall
be entitled to judicial review of a decision made pursuant to this
Chapter. 4 7 The Judicial Review amendment also changed Louisiana
Revised Statutes 49:964(A), by adding subsection (A)(2), which
provides: "no agency or official thereof, or other person acting on
behalf of an agency or official thereof shall be entitled to judicial
review under this Chapter.""
8
Finally, Louisiana also excludes agencies from the definition of
''person" to whom the provisions regarding the right to seek judicial
review of ALJ final decisions apply. 49 The major policy reason for
imposing these rules against agency-initiated judicial review in an
APA system with ALJ finality focused on protecting regulated
entities and individuals from being placed "in the position of having
to compete in the judicial system against the power and unlimited
financial backing of the state."50 Thus, agencies were thought to be in
a better position to use the judicial system than regulated entities and
individuals would be. As a result, the legislature thought the only
47. See 1999 La. Acts No. 1332.
48. Id.
49. See La. R.S. 49:951(5) ("'Person' means any individual, partnership,
corporation, association, governmental subdivision or public or private
organization of any character other than an agency, except that an agency is a
"person" for the purpose of appealing an administrative ruling in a disciplinary
action brought pursuant to Title 37 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 prior
to the final adjudication of such disciplinary action.").
50. Original Amici Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Louisiana Legislature, p. 4
(citing Minutes and audiotape of the House and Governmental Affairs Committee,
May 6, 1999)(hereinafter Amici Legislature). See also Original Brief on Behalf of
Director of DAL, p. 19 (citing Minutes of the May 6, 1999 meetings of the House
Committee on House Governmental Affairs, p. 12)(hereinafter Director's Brief).
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way to sufficiently "level the playing field" was to deny agency-
initiated judicial review. 51
It is important to note that agencies have not generally had the
right to judicial review because agencies managed their own
adjudications, and even with ALJs involved, the agencies had the
final say.52 As a result, there was "no need to appeal a self-imposed
adverse decision." 53 However, agency-initiated judicial review
becomes important when an administrative court style of central
panel, which provides for ALJ finality, is established because the
agency needs some mechanism to fulfill its delegated duty, especially
when it believes the ALJ has made legal error or poor policy.
With Louisiana's preclusion of agency-initiated judicial review,
the legislature rendered Louisiana agencies powerless to make and
enforce law and policy through administrative adjudications. Without
a chance to review the AU's decision, the agency does not have a
say in the final agency decision. In a central panel system, which has
final order authority, the only way to contest a decision with which
the agency disagrees is through the courts in judicial review.
However, even this avenue is closed off to Louisiana agencies. It is
this last step closing off agency-initiated judicial review in a system
with AID finality that raises constitutional concerns regarding the
inherent power of both the judicial and executive branches, which
will be discussed in more detail infra in Section III.
B. The Wooley Conundrum
1. The Facts and Procedural History in Brown and in Wooley
The dispute in both Brown and Wooley arose over an insurance
policy form for rental condominium unit owners for which State
Farm Fire and Casualty Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm)
wanted approval.54 Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:620 requires that
such an insurance policy form must be "filed with and approved by
51. Id.
52. See Bybee, Agency Expertise, supra note 4, at 457.
53. Id.
54. Appellant's Original Brief, Wooley v. State Farm, et al., p. 1, (La. 2004)
(No. 04-882) (hereinafter Appellant's Original Brief).
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the commissioner of insurance" before it may be "issued, delivered,
or used".55 Pursuant to this statute, State Farm filed their policy form
for review and approval.56 The Department of Insurance (hereinafter
Department) rejected the submitted policy form because the
Department believed the representations and warranties provision did
not comply with applicable insurance law.
57
During the time that State Farm's policy form was under review,
the DAL amendment was enacted transferring all adjudicatory power
to the Division of Administrative Law (hereinafter DAL) from the
administrative agencies. 58 As a result, an ALJ of the Louisiana DAL
presided at the hearing regarding State Farm's policy form. This ALJ
ruled in favor of State Farm and against the commissioner of
insurance (hereinafter COI) and the Department. The ALJ ordered
the Department to approve the contested policy form as submitted.59
In response, the COI filed a petition for judicial review of the
ALJ's decision in the matter of Brown v. State Farm,
60
notwithstanding the fact that the definition of "person" explicitly
excluded administrative agencies. 6 1 While this case was pending
before the Nineteenth Judicial District Court, the Louisiana
legislature passed the Judicial Review amendment in 1999
specifically precluding agency-initiated judicial review of adverse
ALJ decisions. 62 The Brown matter culminated before Louisiana's
First Circuit Court of Appeal, where the issue presented was whether
the trial court correctly dismissed State Farm's exception of no right
of action based upon the COI not having a right to seek judicial
review of an ALJ decision.63
The First Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision because of the
55. La. R.S. 22:620.
56. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54; See also Appellee's Original
Brief, Wooley v. State Farm, et al., p. 1, (La. 2004) (No. 04-882) (hereinafter
Appellee's Original Brief).
57. Id. See also Wooley District Court Opinion, supra note 2.
58. Id.
59. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54.
60. Brown v. State Farm, 2000-0539 (La.App. 1 Cir. 6/22/2001), 804 So.2d 41.
61. See Appellant's Original Brief and Appellee's Original Brief, supra note
56. See also La. R.S. 49:951(5).
62. See La. R.S. 49:964(A) and 992(B)(3).
63. Brown, 804 So.2d 41.
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legislature's strong intention to limit agency-initiated judicial
review. 64 More importantly for the Wooley matter, the First Circuit
affirmed the trial court's denial of the COI's request to amend his
petition to allege a constitutional infringement on the judiciary. The
court did so because "the proposed amendment apparently would not
merely add a cause of action or a party, but would substitute one
lawsuit for another, changing the parties, the form of procedure, and
the relief sought."65 The court would be required to modify a petition
for judicial review into a declaratory judgment matter, which would
not be appropriate.
66
As a result, any res judicata or issue preclusion claims in the
Wooley matter ultimately did not succeed because Wooley alleges the
substance of the refused amendment in an action for declaratory
judgment, not a petition for judicial review.67 In Wooley, the COI
asked the court to declare both the DAL amendment and the Judicial
Review amendment unconstitutional.68 The COI also sought to enjoin
the operations of the DAL.6 9 The trial court conducted a hearing on
the permanent injunction.70 Upon the trial court's determination that
both statutes were unconstitutional, State Farm filed an appeal with
the Louisiana State Supreme Court.7'
2. The Trial Court's Oral Reasons for Judgment
The trial court ultimately held both the DAL amendment and the
Judicial Review amendment unconstitutional. As fact, the trial court
found that similar policy forms submitted by other foreign insurers
operating in Louisiana were rejected, and those insurers accepted the
64. Id. at 45-46. See also Amicus Baier, supra note 28, at 6.
65. Brown, 804 So.2d at 47.
66. Id.
67. See Wooley State Supreme Court Decision, supra note 3, at 771-72
("...although the judgment of the [First Circuit] court of appeal in the previous
litigation was final, State Farm's exception of res judicata was properly denied as
the instant cause of action [Wooley] did not arise out of the transaction or
occurrence that was the subject matter of the litigation.").
68. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54, at 2.
69. Id.
70. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54, at 3; See also Appellee's
Original Brief, supra note 56, at 2.
71. See Appellant's Original Brief, supra note 54, at 4.
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agency's interpretation, unlike State Farm. 72 Even though the trial
court found several constitutional infringements, only the relevant
findings are briefly discussed here.
First, the trial court held that both amendments violated the
separation of powers doctrine by vesting judicial power in the
executive branch, and by obliterating a judicial check on the
executive branch.73 Second, the court urged that the Judicial Review
amendment violated the separation of powers doctrine by
diminishing the judiciary's power to hear matters involving questions
of law.
74
Third, the DAL amendment was held violative of Article V,
which is Louisiana's judiciary article, by divesting the district courts
of original jurisdiction.75 The trial court viewed the DAL as an
independent judiciary within the executive branch, which is only
limited by the executive branch and not by the judicial branch.
Finally, the trial court concluded that the Judicial Review amendment
was unconstitutional because it denied the representative of the
citizens of Louisiana, the COI, the opportunity to protect their
interests against an illegal policy form through judicial review.77
3. The Louisiana Supreme Court Speaks
As a result of Louisiana's unique APA, which combines a central
panel system of ALJ finality with a preclusion of agency-initiated
judicial review, the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Wooley
will be examined in depth by administrative and constitutional
scholars, lawyers, and legislators around the country. This is because
if the rationale supporting either the constitutionality or the
unconstitutionality of such a system is convincing, other states might
be encouraged to either follow Louisiana's lead or to view Wooley as
persuasive authority to not go as far as Louisiana did. With such an
important and possibly trend-setting decision, it is quite unfortunate
72. See Wooley District Court Opinion, supra note 2.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
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that the Louisiana Supreme Court was only half right in their
decision. The court correctly held the DAL amendment to be
constitutionally sound; however, it spent entirely too much time on
irrelevant arguments supporting the constitutionality of this
amendment.78
The major constitutional concern in this case was not the DAL
amendment alone, but rather the Judicial Review amendment in
combination with the DAL amendment. It is the contention of this
comment that had the Louisiana Legislature stopped with the DAL
amendment, no constitutional concerns would have surfaced. Yet,
Louisiana went a step too far in combining a denial of agency-
initiated judicial review with a system of ALJ finality. Apparently,
the Louisiana Supreme Court disagrees, at least as far as can be seen
from a thirty-nine page opinion of which only about four pages are
dedicated to discussing the major issue in this case, the
constitutionality of the Judicial Review amendment.
In quite a cavalier fashion, the court quickly dismissed any claims
that the Judicial Review amendment was unconstitutional by holding
"that under the particular factual circumstances presented in this
matter, the Commissioner has not shown Act 1332 [Judicial Review
amendment] to be unconstitutional. ' ' 79 Thus, the court applied a
heavy burden on the COI to prove this amendment was
unconstitutional because of the general presumption that statutes are
constitutional. 80 The court followed this by opining about the
possibility of the COI bringing a declaratory judgment when he
believed the ALJ made legal error, even though the court itself
admitted that "it is questionable whether [the COI] could change the
result of the underlying adjudication." 81 Instead of deciding the
matter itself, the court remanded to the First Circuit Court of Appeal
the narrow issue of whether the COI is entitled to seek declaratory
judgment regarding whether the RCU policy form complies with the
78. See Wooley State Supreme Court Decision, supra note 3, at 761-67 (an in-
depth examination of the bases on which the court upheld the constitutionality of
the DAL amendment is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on a
thorough critique of the bases on which the court upheld the constitutionality of the
Judicial Review amendment).
79. Id. at 768.
80. Id. at 761.
81.Id. at 770.
law and whether the district court correctly determined that it does
not.82 This was done even though the First Circuit never had this case
as a result of the direct appeal from the district court to the Louisiana
Supreme Court.
There are four rationales upon which the court based this decision
regarding the Judicial Review amendment. First, the principle that
state agencies cannot appeal decisions made by other state agencies
precludes the COI from seeking judicial review of this new executive
branch agency's decisions. 83  Second, since the COI has no
constitutionally-defined powers and duties, he only has the
constitutional right to exist, and only the legislature "has the right to
define his powers and duties." 84 The implication being that since the
legislature specifically disallowed the COI the right to seek judicial
review, he has no constitutional claim to such a right. Third, since an
agency or the COI representing the agency is not a "person" intended
to be protected by Article I of the Louisiana Constitution, neither the
agency itself nor the COI has a constitutional right to access the
courts. 85  Finally, the court concluded that because "ALJs make
administrative law rulings that are not subject to enforcement and do
not have the force of law," there was no constitutional problem of the
executive overstepping the judiciary. 86 Upon examination of the
court's decision as a whole, this last rationale appears to underlie the
court's ultimate decision to uphold the constitutionality of
Louisiana's current APA. All of these arguments and rationales
advanced by the court will be analyzed and critiqued in the next
section, infra.
4. The Louisiana Legislature Reacts
On June 29, 2005 following the supreme court's decision in
Wooley, the Louisiana legislature amended Revised Statutes
49:992(B)(2) to add the following sentence: "Upon the issuance of
such a final decision or order, the agency or any official thereof shall
82. Id. at 772.
83. Id. at 768-69.
84. Id. at 770.
85. Id. at 768.
86. Id. at 764.
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comply fully with the final order or decision of the administrative
law judge." The problem with this amendment is that it negates the
underlying rationale advanced by the Wooley court in favor of the
constitutionality of Louisiana's current APA. If the agency against
whom the ALJ ruled is now statutorily compelled to fully comply
with the ALJ's final order, then it cannot be logically argued that
ALJs make "rulings that are not subject to enforcement and do not
have the force of law."
88
If the agency is compelled to follow the ALJ's final decision,
then that decision is subject to enforcement against the agency, and
thus it does have the force of law as pertains to all parties involved in
the matter. This is because the agency must comply with the ALJ's
decision, which is in favor of the regulated entity or individual, and
this regulated party is free to act in a manner consistent with the
ALJ's final decision. Given this new amendment, the Louisiana
Supreme Court must revisit this issue again in light of the
legislature's obliteration of the court's underlying rationale for
upholding the constitutionality of Louisiana's current APA.
III. ANALYSIS OF LOUISIANA'S APA AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is." 89 With these simple, eloquent
words, Chief Justice Marshall mobilized the antiquated legal system
in the United States towards the judicial review enjoyed today.
Despite the vast number of times historians and scholars alike have
quoted this important language, students of the law, as well as
citizens of this great country, often take for granted exactly what
Chief Justice Marshall accomplished with this statement.
With the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison,90 the United
States Supreme Court laid to rest any lingering doubt regarding
whose right and duty it was to say what the law is. It clearly lies with
87. La. R.S. 49:992(B)(2) (2005); See also note 42 supra.
88. Id.
89. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
90. Id.
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the courts through judicial review. This is a tremendous power and
responsibility that is not to be taken lightly. As a result, anytime
Congress or a state legislature denies judicial review, courts should
strictly scrutinize that denial lest these foundational principles upon
which our entire legal system is based be placed in jeopardy.
This section analyzes the constitutional arguments against the
Judicial Review amendment and critiques the arguments and
rationales advanced by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Wooley. As
this section details, the ultimate conclusion the court should have
reached is that the Judicial Review amendment is unconstitutional
because it impermissibly infringes on both the judicial and executive
branches. Nevertheless, the Louisiana Supreme Court correctly
determined that the trial court was incorrect in striking the DAL
amendment down as unconstitutional because a central panel with
final order authority does not necessarily run afoul of the separation
of powers doctrine.
Additionally, this section details how the lack of a right to seek
judicial review "changes the nature of the power exercised by the
ALJ," which the court specifically found the COI had not shown in
Wooley.91 Finally, this section illustrates how Louisiana went a step
too far in combining a system of final order authority with a denial of
agency-initiated judicial review. The remedy to this problem is not
the striking of both amendments, but instead lies in striking the
unconstitutional denial of agency-initiated judicial review, while
maintaining Louisiana's administrative court style of central panel.
A. Infringement on the Judicial Branch
1. Crucial Check on Executive Branch Obliterated
Louisiana's current APA raises several separation of powers
concerns. First, the denial of agency-initiated judicial review in
combination with a central panel of ALJ finality is problematic
because such a prohibition obliterates a crucial check on executive
branch activities. Many scholars advocate that "judicial review of
administrative actions provides a crucial check on the delegation of
91. See Wooley State Supreme Court Decision, supra note 3, at 769.
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executive powers." 92 When the legislature passes a law and delegates
the authority to promulgate, enforce, and interpret corresponding
regulations to an agency, the courts through judicial review are the
only guardians against excesses by executive branch agencies. As a
result, all agency and all ALJ decisions must be open for judicial
review to protect against executive branch excesses.
However, Louisiana's system, as a central panel with ALJ
finality, transfers the adjudicatory powers of traditional agencies to
the ALJs in its central panel, which is also a part of the executive
branch.93 In effect, the Louisiana system currently allows decisional
finality where it has never been allowed before. Even under the old
Louisiana system modeled after the 1961 Model Act, 94 final agency
decisions were subject to judicial review by Louisiana courts. Since
traditional agency decisions were always subject to judicial review,
final ALJ decisions substituting for agency decisions in Louisiana's
new central panel must be as well.
Louisiana's Judicial Review amendment denies agency-initiated
judicial review of adverse ALJ decisions. Thus, if an ALJ rules
against the agency in favor of the regulated entity or individual, the
agency cannot seek judicial review of that decision. Consequently, a
particular kind of executive branch activity, that of the ALJ ruling
against the agency, escapes judicial scrutiny under this scheme
precluding agency-initiated judicial review. Therefore, a crucial
check on a particular kind of executive branch activity is eviscerated,
which leaves room for executive branch excesses.
For example, suppose there is a renegade ALJ who is truly a
"man of the people" and who wants to be active in acquiring as many
favorable decisions for aggrieved persons as possible. Suppose
further, as in a situation similar to Wooley, there is an ALJ who is
truly in favor of regulated entities, and as a result, he or she
consistently rules in favor of regulated entities, such as State Farm.
Regulated entities engage in a wide spectrum of activities that must
be regulated not just to protect citizens from financial ruin, but also
92. See McGrath, Project, supra note 46, at 571.
93. See La. R.S. 49:995 (2003). This statute states the Director of the DAL is
to be appointed by the Governor. Thus, both the Director of the DAL and the DAL
itself operate within the Executive Branch.
94. See text accompanying Section I(A), supra.
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to provide for the citizens' safety and well-being. One example
includes nuclear power plants. If an ALJ consistently rules in favor of
the nuclear power plant industry, there will be less regulation. Since
regulated entities are normally in favor of less regulation to keep
their costs down, such a renegade ALJ would seriously undermine
the agency's delegated duty to enforce the statute's regulations. Such
a scenario endangers the persons intended to be protected by the
applicable regulations.
Even worse, under Louisiana's current APA, such culpable
activity is not subject to any judicial scrutiny because as long as the
ALJ rules against the agency, whatever the ALJ says goes with no
opportunity for judicial review. As a result, the ALJs rule the world
of administrative law in Louisiana. One scholar aptly recognized,
"judicial review ... provides protection against improper or illegal
administrative action." 95 As illustrated here, in the absence of judicial
review, impropriety reigns.
As stated by Judge James L. Dennis of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, "the underlying constitutional
conception [of separation of powers concerns] is that those with
governmental power must be subject to the limits of law, and that the
limits should be determined, not by those institutions whose authority
is in question, but by an impartial judiciary. ' '96 Louisiana's Judicial
Review amendment ignores this important constitutional conception
because when ALJs rule against the agencies involved, those
decisions are not subject to review "by an impartial judiciary., 97
Since ALJs now have the power to conduct administrative
adjudications, all of their decisions must be open for judicial review,
not just some, so that the judiciary may be able to set the limits of the
ALJs' power instead of the limits being set by the executive branch
central panel itself.
Since Louisiana's denial of judicial review destroys a check on
executive branch power by not only allowing decisional finality
where it has never been allowed before, but also by denying judicial
review of a particular kind of executive branch activity, the
95. See McGrath, Project, supra note 46.
96. Judge James L. Dennis, Judicial Power and the Administrative State, 62
La. L. Rev. 59, 74 (hereinafter Judge Dennis, Judicial Power).
97. Id.
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judiciary's power to say what the law is by overseeing the executive
branch has been invaded. Thus, the equilibrium between the judicial
branch and the executive branch is necessarily compromised in
contravention to Louisiana's separation of powers doctrine as
constitutionally provided by Article II, Sections 1 and 2.98
2. Divestiture of the Jurisdiction of Article V Courts and Agency
Appeals
A second concern raised by Louisiana's current APA is whether
or not the legislature has deprived Article V courts of jurisdiction by
creating an administrative court, the DAL, and coupling that with a
denial of agency-initiated judicial review.99 Consideration of this
question is important for Louisiana, and also for proponents in favor
of installing a central panel in the federal APA because, as urged by
Judge Dennis, "Article V and Article III [of the United States
Constitution] appear designed to promote the same basic values and
objects." In order to fully appreciate the merits of this concern
regarding the deprivation of Article V jurisdiction, it must be placed
in the proper context.
Article V vests "original jurisdiction" of civil matters in a
"supreme court, courts of appeal, district courts, and other courts
authorized by this Article", and it also provides for appellate
jurisdiction. 00  However, classification of administrative
adjudications as "civil matters" creates confusion with regard to the
whole concept of administrative agencies. Any argument that the
legislature has divested Article V courts of jurisdiction, which is
made on a strict, non-delegation, separation of powers theory, calls
into question the quasi-judicial functions of agencies. As has been
clear for some time, such a strict interpretation of the separation of
powers doctrine is stunted by an "inexorable growth of the
administrative state."''
In the correct context, however, this concern of stripping Article
V courts of their "appellate" rather than "original" jurisdiction has
98. La. Const. art. I, §§ 1-2.
99. See Bybee, Agency Expertise, supra note 4, at 462.
100. La. Const. art. V, §§ 1 and 16(A).
101. McGrath, Project, supra note 46, at 579.
merit. When Article V courts are divested of their appellate
jurisdiction, the end result is a destruction of a crucial check on the
executive branch, as discussed supra. Therefore, these two
constitutional infringements are very closely related. The major
"transfer of power" argument urged in brief and at oral arguments in
favor of the Director of the DAL in Wooley is the perfect illustration
of this point. As stated in brief by Daniel Webb, attorney for the
director,
Simply put, one of the purposes of Act 739 (creation of the DAL)
was to transfer the final decision making authority from the
Executive Branch departments to the DAL. The Legislature in
making that determination did not "strip " the Judicial Branch of its
jurisdiction. Rather it simply transferred an Executive Branch
function from one Executive Branch agency to another Executive
Branch agency. It also made the Administrative Law System of
Louisiana much fairer to its citizens.'
0 2
The gist of this argument is that the powers exercised by
traditional agencies were merely transferred to the insulated DAL,
which is just another agency within the executive branch. As a result
of this transfer, the judicial branch is not stripped of any jurisdiction
because matters formerly adjudicated by traditional agencies are
currently adjudicated by the central panel agency, the DAL.
While the transfer of authority part of this argument is certainly
true, the rest of the argument ignores one important fact. Historically,
all executive branch agencies have been subject to judicial review. In
his law review article published in 2001 after the passage of
Louisiana's Judicial Review amendment, Judge Dennis outlined the
following factors on which administrative agencies were subject to
review by the courts: (1) violations of the constitution or statutory
provisions; (2) exceeding the statutory authority of the agency; (3)
unlawful procedure; (4) errors of law; (5) arbitrary or capricious
exercise of discretion; and (6) manifest error in view of reliable,
probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record. 0 3 From this,
102. See Director's Brief, supra note 50, at 7.
103. See Judge Dennis, Judicial Power, supra note 96, at 94 (citing Save
Ourselves, Inc. v. The Louisiana Environmental Control Commission, 452 So.2d
1152, 1158 (La. 1984), which was well before the 1995 amendment creating the
DAL and the 1999 amendment precluding agency-initiated judicial review).
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it is quite clear that agency decisions have been and continue to be
subject to judicial review, and a rather searching review at that. This
is especially true of decisions of law and of policy.
Judge Dennis urges that "the 1974 [the current] Louisiana
Constitution plainly vests in courts established and authorized by
Article V the judicial power to declare laws unconstitutional and to
review the actions of the executive branch of government."'' 0 4 Since
the DAL is merely another executive branch agency, and as a result
of agency decisions being subject to rather searching judicial
scrutiny, ALJ decisions adverse to the agencies involved must also be
subject to the same judicial review. If not, then Louisiana Article V
courts have been divested of their appellate jurisdiction to oversee
particular executive branch actions for the factors noted by Judge
Dennis.
It seems the Louisiana Supreme Court either overlooked or
ignored Judge Dennis' article even though it was put before them by
Amicus Baier. Perhaps the result in Wooley would have been
different had adequate attention been given to these important
considerations. One of the bases for the court's decision was the
principle that state agencies cannot appeal decisions made by other
state agencies, thus precluding the COI from seeking judicial review
of this new executive branch agency's decisions.'
0 5
Yet therein lies the problem - all decisions by traditional
agencies were always subject to judicial review. Now, this new DAL
agency is not subject to judicial review as long as the ALJ rules
against the agency. This subset of executive branch decisions escapes
judicial scrutiny, which has never before occurred with traditional
agencies. The principle that state agencies cannot appeal decisions of
other state agencies was formulated in an era where agency heads
made the final agency decisions. 106 Since the agencies had a
104. See Judge Dennis, Judicial Power, supra note 96, at 78-79 (citing La.
Const. Art. V, § 5(D); Progressive Sec. Ins. Co. v. Foster, 711 So.2d 675 (La.
1998); Bruneau v. Edwards, 517 So.2d 818 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1987); Carso v. Bd.
Of Liquidation of State Debt, 205 La. 368, 17 So.2d 358 (1944); Graham v. Jones,
198 La. 507, 3 So.2d 761 (1941)).
105. See Wooley State Supreme Court Decision, supra note 3, at 768-70.
106. Id. (citing State through Dept. Of Pub. Safety and Corrections, Office of
State Police, Riverboat Gaming Div. v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Com 'n, 94-
1872, (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 292. It is important to note that even though this
mechanism that allowed them to perform their delegated duty to
make law and policy through administrative adjudications, other non-
interested agencies had no right to contradict decisions made by other
agencies.
Now that all agency adjudications have been transplanted to one
central executive agency, the agencies themselves have been cut out
of the process leaving them no other alternative but to seek judicial
review when they disagree with the central panel's determination.
The agencies must have a mechanism that allows them to perform
their delegated duty. Therefore, the "established principle" that
agencies cannot seek judicial review of other agency decisions,
which was liberally applied by the court in Wooley, is inapplicable to
Louisiana's current APA where final agency decisions are made by
one centralized agency that escapes judicial scrutiny as long as the
ALJ rules against the agency involved. If the right to handle all
agency adjudications transferred to the DAL, surely the traditional
obligation to have all agency decisions subject to judicial review
likewise transferred to the DAL.
With this denial of judicial review of certain ALJ decisions,
which are now the final agency decisions, this new central panel
agency has greater rights than any other agency has ever had.
Namely, this new agency is not subject to judicial review when the
ALJs rule against the traditional agencies. Just as Louisiana's Judicial
Review amendment obliterates a crucial check on the executive
branch,' 0 7 it also divests the judiciary's inherent power and
jurisdiction to oversee certain executive branch ALJ decisions. Such
a scheme is not constitutionally acceptable.
3. Divestiture of the Judiciary's Inherent Authority to Decide
Questions of Law
The final concern raised by Louisiana's current APA is that the
case recognizes the common law principle that agencies cannot seek judicial
review of other agency decisions, this recognition was based on the previous APA
prior to the DAL amendment, which according to Act No. 739 took effect on and
after October 1, 1996. Therefore, this principle remains inapplicable to the current
LAPA).
107. See Section III(A)(1), supra.
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judiciary has been divested of its inherent authority to hear and
decide questions of law. Many ALJ decisions adverse to agencies
involve questions of law. Thus, a denial of judicial review of those
decisions is in effect a denial of judicial review of questions of law.
The more likely scenario is that many ALJ decisions adverse to
agencies will be mixed questions of law, fact, and policy. However, it
is this denial of review of questions of law that raises the biggest
concern among constitutional scholars. In Wooley, the ALJ made a
determination regarding the application of the Insurance Code to
State Farm's submitted policy form. Since the ALJ decided to
approve State Farm's policy form, this decision of law was contrary
to the agency's interpretation of regulations promulgated by the
agency itself.
According to Louisiana's Judicial Review amendment, this
determination of law is un-reviewable by Louisiana courts because it
is adverse to the agency. This is a more serious constitutional
infraction than the destruction of a judicial check on the executive
branch, which results in the divestiture of the jurisdiction of Article V
courts. This is because the judiciary is being denied the right to
review questions of law, which is the judiciary's premier province.
As a result, the Judicial Review amendment divests the judiciary of
its inherent authority to say what the law is, which unconstitutionally
alters the equilibrium between the judicial and executive branches.
B. Infringement on the Executive Branch
1. The COI's Core Function and Delegated Duty
As posed by Professor Rossi in his recent nationwide analysis of
the increasing trend towards ALJ finality, "if - as in Louisiana - a
state agency is prohibited from appealing a final ALJ order (only
private parties are afforded appellate remedies) would this undermine
the legislature's delegation of policy decisions to the agency or
otherwise interfere with powers at the core of politically accountable
executive branch agencies?"' 0 8 This question encapsulates the issues
the Judicial Review amendment raises with respect to its
infringement on the executive branch. At oral arguments in Wooley,
108. See Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible, supra note 1, at 65.
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many of the questions posed by both Justice Kimball and Justice
Weimer focused on whether there is any core function in the
COJ, 10as well as whether the COI has any inherent authority that
might be endangered by the denial of agency-initiated judicial
review. 1
10
Before one can fully appreciate these two inquiries, as well as the
court's response, it is necessary to understand the actual dynamics of
the situation posed in the Wooley case. In the dispute between State
Farm and the COI, the only representative of the people is the COI
who was duly elected, as constitutionally and statutorily provided.
This fact was highlighted during oral arguments before the Louisiana
Supreme Court when the attorney for State Farm argued that "the
COI should not be allowed to prevent the marketing of the State
Farm policy forms.""' The main reason the COI has stood in such
staunch opposition to the marketing of this policy form is because he
does not believe that it complies with the law. The COI has a
statutory duty to ensure that all approved policy forms comply with
applicable Insurance Code regulations promulgated by the
Department of Insurance of which the COI is the agency head." 
2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:2(A)(1) specifically states that
"insurance is an industry affected with the public interest and it is the
purpose of this Code to regulate that industry in all its phases.. .it shall
be the duty of the commissioner of insurance to administer the
provisions of this Code."" 3 Thus, a logical inference is that the COI,
as the duly elected officer in charge of the Department of Insurance,
is charged with the duty of protecting the public interest regarding
insurance. This duty is adjunct to the COI's responsibility to
"administer the provisions" of the Insurance Code. A denial of
agency-initiated judicial review in a system with ALJ finality
necessarily infringes upon the Executive COI's ability to fully
discharge his duty to protect the public interest regarding insurance.
Absent a right in the COI to challenge the ALJ's approval of the
109. Commissioner of Insurance.
110. The writer was present at oral arguments before the Louisiana Supreme
Court, 9/7/2004.
111. Id.
112. La. R.S. 22:620(A)(1).
113. La. R.S. 22:2(A)(1).
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policy form, no one else will be able to protect the public from what
the COI considers to be an illegal policy form.
Therefore, it could be reasonably argued that one of the functions,
powers or duties inherent in the COI's position, as a politically
accountable entity, is that of protecting the public interest. If the field
of insurance is truly "affected with the public interest,"'' 4 then surely
the core function of the COI, as the guardian charged with the duty of
administering the Insurance Code, is to administer the Code in such a
way as to protect the public interest.
Yet the Louisiana Supreme Court disagrees. The court in Wooley
took great pains to establish the history surrounding the
indoctrination of the COI as a constitutional entity. The court
ultimately concluded that since the delegates refused to enumerate
any rights and duties of the COI in the constitution, the rights and
duties of the COI were only to be created by the legislature by
statute. 15 The court used this to support its conclusion that since the
legislature specifically denied agency-initiated judicial review, the
COI has no such constitutional right.16
The court's major flaw here is that of form over substance. The
inquiry into a constitutional violation is not foreclosed simply
because the right to seek judicial review is not enumerated in the
constitution as one of the COI's rights and duties. The court's own
excerpts cited in its opinion illustrate the major point of contention at
the constitutional convention was specifying the COI's rate-making
function, 117 which is totally irrelevant to the constitutionality of the
Judicial Review amendment. Whether the COI is a constitutional
entity or not, the COI has a core function, as well as other rights and
duties delegated to it by the legislature. Thus, a constitutional
infraction is possible regardless of the enumeration of the COI's
rights and duties in the constitution itself.
To adequately perform his administrative duties, the COI must
protect the public interest. With no opportunity to petition a court of
law for judicial review of decisions with which the executive COI
believes is in derogation of the public's interest, the COI is stripped
114. Id.
115. See Wooley State Supreme Court Decision, supra note 3, at 758-62, 770.
116. Id. at 768, 770.
117. Id. at 759-60.
of his core function and is undermined in performing his delegated
duty. As a result, such an infringement is an impermissible extension
of legislative power into the executive's realm in contravention of
Louisiana's doctrine of separation of powers, despite the CO1 having
no constitutionally enumerated rights and duties.
2. Agencies as "Persons" Entitled to Judicial Review
The final basis for the court's decision to uphold the
constitutionality of the Judicial Review amendment was that since
the agency was not a "person" intended to be protected by Article I
of the Louisiana Constitution, an agency has no constitutional right to
seek judicial review. 118 The court's own cited quote describing
Article I illustrates the irony of this decision, i.e "[Article I] protects
the rights of individuals against unwarrantable government action
and does not shield state agencies from law passed by the people's
duly elected representatives."''
9
First, the new central panel agency, the DAL, is being shielded
from review by the courts when the ALJs rule against the agency.
Yet there is no protection of the rights of individuals as mandated by
Article I because absent a right in the COI to seek judicial review, no
one can protect the public's rights. Second, the only representative of
the people in a situation similar to Wooley is the COI himself who is
charged with protecting the public interest as regards insurance. The
COL is trying to vindicate the public's interest. Finally, the COI is
politically accountable for his decisions; whereas, the ALJs in the
DAL are not because they are appointed. Thus, if the public disagrees
with an agency decision, the public has no recourse against the
insulated DAL central panel as they would have against the COI by
political control.
As a result, new situations call for new remedies to protect the
intended beneficiaries of law. It is quite clear that Article I of the
Louisiana Constitution was intended to protect the rights of
individuals. In a situation where the only protector of these rights is
denied the right to seek judicial review of government action, clearly
118. Id. at 768.
119. Id. (citing Board of Comm 'rs of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Department of
Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281, 287 (La. 1986) (on rehearing)).
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the true intent and spirit of Article I has been invaded. With such
drastic changes to Louisiana's APA, the court incorrectly applied law
that made sense under the traditional agency regime, but which
currently lacks both logic and consistency with the constitution given
this new agency context.
It is as if the current APA has reduced the agency to the position
of an interested party who has no control over the outcome of the
case. In such a situation, both parties should be entitled to seek
judicial review of adverse decisions. Whether such a result was
intended by the legislature, this is the only constitutionally acceptable
scenario in a system with ALJ finality. This scenario is similar to a
situation in which an individual or a corporation brings suit against
the state, and following an adverse decision against the state, the state
appeals to a higher court.
IV. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS BETWEEN LOUISIANA AND THE
CAROLINAS
In order to fully comprehend the gravity of the constitutional
ramifications of Louisiana's APA, this section analyzes the APAs in
two other central panel states. Although South Carolina's APA is an
example of an extreme "administrative court" style of central panel,
it is not as extreme as Louisiana's APA. North Carolina is a model of
compromise for other states because it has struck the appropriate
balance between competing interests, and unlike Louisiana's APA, is
constitutionally sound.
A. South Carolina 's APA - Extreme, But Not as Extreme as
Louisiana
South Carolina's APA is similar to Louisiana's APA in that both
are administrative court style central panels. Scholar William B.
Swent argues that South Carolina blends the central panel model with
the "administrative court" model. 12 The South Carolina
Administrative Law Judge Division (hereinafter ALJD) is fully
within the executive branch, thus it has a quasi-judicial nature as
120. See Swent, South Carolina's ALJ, supra note 14, at 2.
opposed to a purely judicial nature.' 2 1 This is similar to Louisiana's
DAL, which is fully within the executive branch as well. 122 ALJs in
South Carolina render final and immediately appealable decisions on
a variety of issues, 123 just like Louisiana ALJs. One major difference
from Louisiana's APA, however, is that South Carolina differentiates
which issues can be finally adjudged by ALJs based upon the nature
of the agency involved.
First, when an agency is headed by a commission or a board, the
AL's decision is subject to a limited review by the agency involved
prior to issuance of the final agency decision. As a result of these
agencies being afforded the final say, there is no need for agency-
initiated judicial review. The same is not true of central panels with
final order authority, such as the DAL in Louisiana. South Carolina
provides the needed mechanism to allow agencies headed by
commissions or boards to fulfill their delegated duty, while
respecting the fairness concerns of regulated entities and individuals.
Second, for agencies headed by a single director, the ALJ's
decision becomes the final agency decision, thus denying the agency
any final say on the final agency decision.' 25 Even though this
scheme is similar to Louisiana's system of AU finality, the major
difference is that South Carolina's AU final order authority applies
only to a small subset of agencies. Louisiana's ALJ finality applies
across the board to all Louisiana agencies except for very few,
specified agencies. If Wooley occurred in South Carolina, the ALJ's
decision would have been final there as it was in Louisiana because
the COI is a single director agency head. Yet, even this scheme of
ALJ finality poses no serious constitutional problems, unless it is
coupled with a legislative denial of agency-initiated judicial review,
as Louisiana's APA is. As long as the agency head is allowed a right
to seek judicial review, there is nothing per se unconstitutional about
a scheme of AU final order authority.2
Finally, occupational and licensing agency boards render final
121. Id. at 5.
122. See supra note 93.
123. See Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible, supra note 1, at 61.
124. See Swent, South Carolina's AL!, supra note 14, at 12.
125. Id. at 13.
126. See Amicus Baier, supra note 28, at 14.
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agency decisions; however, South Carolina's ALJD acts as an
appellate court for these agency decisions. 127 Judicial review of the
ALJ appeal is a matter of right, and the courts review the record
developed by the agency. 128 Here, these agencies make the initial
decision, which is subject to review first by the ALJD, and then by
the courts as a matter of right. Since the agency is not completely cut
out of the decision-making process, there are no overwhelming
constitutional concerns with this scheme.
Even though South Carolina is one of the few extreme states
employing ALJ finality in some form, Louisiana's APA is even more
extreme in that it completely denies agency-initiated judicial review
without providing any mechanism for agencies to perform their
delegated duty. Had Louisiana stopped short of completely cutting
off agency-initiated judicial review, its scheme of ALJ finality would
not run afoul of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.
Unfortunately, the Louisiana legislature went a step too far.
B. North Carolina's APA - The Model of Compromise for Other
States
In 2000, North Carolina amended its APA in several significant
ways. Actually passing these amendments proved to be quite a long,
hard-fought battle, which began in the State House of
Representatives. The bill, as introduced, provided for ALJ finality of
decisions, as well as for agency-initiated judicial review. 129
Obviously, the North Carolina General Assembly was sensitive to the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Even though the final
bill changed substantially due to the ensuing debate and compromise
regarding ALJ finality, it is quite remarkable that even in its most
extreme form, this North Carolina bill never contemplated denying
agency-initiated judicial review in an APA system with ALJ finality.
Instead, this debate centered on the logistics of instituting ALJ
finality.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Brad Miller, What Were We Thinking?: Legislative Intent and the 2000
Amendments to the North Carolina APA, 79 N.C. L. Rev. 1657, 1658 (2001)
(hereinafter Miller, What Were We Thinking?).
The North Carolina Senate received an onslaught of arguments
from both sides of this debate over instituting AU finality. The
supporters of the amendments argued that the procedural unfairness
inherent in allowing one of the parties to a dispute to be the judge
was unacceptable. They also urged that agencies continuously reject
AU decisions that are not favorable to the agencies, and enter final
decisions upholding the agencies' stance.1 30 Finally, the supporters
also contended that the AU has the benefit of experiencing the
witnesses' demeanor under cross-examination; whereas, the
agencies's decisions are usually based only on the "cold record",
which would be equally available to a judge on judicial review.' 31 In
other words, the agency should not be allowed to change the AL's
decision because the agency is in no better position to do so than
either the ALJ or a judge on judicial review.
On the other side of the debate, the opponents of the bill argued
that the AL's duties should not exceed those of a hearing officer
who compiles the record for a final decision to be made by the
agency.'3 Any recommended ALJ decision was simply something to
be considered by the agency.' 33 The opponents also contended that
many decisions turn on issues of expertise fully within the ambit of
the agencies' specialized knowledge, and, as such, agencies "should
not be bound by a lay AU fact finding that was contrary to the
agency's expert knowledge."' 134 Finally, opponents urged that the
Executive Branch's power to govern by consistently applying the law
would be seriously undermined by giving ALJs the authority to
render final decisions with no opportunity for agency review.' 
35
As Professor Daye said, "[tihe [North Carolina] General
Assembly crafted an approach that represents a middle ground."'
136
He believes this new legislation changed three areas of North
Carolina's administrative law: first, it constituted ALJs as "quasi-
judicial officials in the executive branch."' 137 Second, AU decisions
130. Id. at 1660.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1661
135. Id.
136. See Daye, Powers ofAdministrative Law Judges, supra note 30, at 1579.
137. Id. at 1577-78.
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are given more effect "without giving ALJs so much power that they
effectively oust agencies of their proper decisional role.""' Finally,
judicial review is more extensive when agencies reject the ALJ's
decisions, "while stopping short of transforming courts into 'super
agencies' that usurp statutory powers of agencies."' 39 In the end,
agencies have the authority to make the final decision, but when the
agency rejects the ALJ's decision, the standard for judicial review
will be de novo.140 The ALJ is required to give deference to the
agency's expertise, so long as the agency adequately demonstrates its
expertise.
141
Obviously, the North Carolina General Assembly engaged in a
thorough analysis of arguments on both sides of the debate. Not once,
however, did they consider instituting ALJ finality with a denial of
agency-initiated judicial review. Unlike North Carolina's APA,
Louisiana has given its ALJs "so much power that they effectively
oust agencies of their proper decisional role"'' 42 because Louisiana
agencies have no mechanism to fulfill their delegated duty.
Additionally, the court's statement in Wooley that "ALJs make
administrative law rulings that are not subject to enforcement and do
not have the force of law" is quite remarkable. 143 If this is true, it is
hard to believe that the Louisiana legislature intended to have an
unenforceable system of ALJ finality. Where questions of law, in
particular, are decided with no opportunity for judicial review, those
decisions of law are final and have the effect of law because no
alternative exists to question those decisions. It was this very issue
that prompted the vigorous debate in North Carolina, and to their
credit, the North Carolina APA serves as a model compromise
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Miller, What Were We Thinking?, supra note 129, at 1661.
141. Id. Regarding how an agency might adequately demonstrate its expertise,
Senator Brad Miller, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary II Committee, said, "in the
end, we decided not to decide. Again, the procedures by which the ALJ decides
how agency expertise can be demonstrated should never be an issue on judicial
review. When the decision of the ALJ differs from the final agency decision, the
question on judicial review is not the procedural correctness of the decision below,
but rather a de novo review of the record." Id. at 1662-63.
142. See Daye, Powers of Administrative Law Judges, supra note 30, at 1577-
78.
143. See Wooley State Supreme Court Decision, supra note 3, at 764.
representing all sides.
V. PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTIONALLY SOUND LAPA
A. Allow Agencies the Right to Judicial Review
The first proposal for a constitutionally sound LAPA is to keep
the current DAL system, but simply allow agencies the right to seek
judicial review. This proposal is consistent with a system of ALJ
finality, but it is unnecessary in a system that already allows the
agency some say, whether initial or final, in the decision making
process. Louisiana's current denial of judicial review coupled with
ALJ finality completely cuts agencies off from making law and
policy. Instead, both are currently made by the ALJs in the DAL with
no opportunity for agency review. This proposal provides
Louisiana's system of ALJ final order authority with the necessary
mechanism for agencies to fulfill their delegated duties.
In a central panel with final order authority, such as Louisiana's
DAL, the agency is reduced from an adjudicator to merely an
interested party to the adjudication. Such a reduction is appropriate
given the strong policy arguments in favor of central panels and ALJ
finality. However, as in any other adjudication, all parties to the
litigation must be granted the right to seek judicial review. A fair and
constitutionally sound system requires some give and take. If the
ALJs are to have final order authority, then in order for the agencies
to be able to perform their delegated duty of enforcing the regulations
they promulgate, agencies must be granted the right to seek judicial
review of adverse ALJ final orders. By allowing agencies the right to
judicial review, at least the judiciary's power is not infringed because
ALJ questions of law adverse to the agency may be appealed to
Article V courts. Also, the executive's power is not infringed because
the agencies are still allowed some mechanism to make and enforce
law and policy.
One important criticism of this proposal is that such a system is
invariably biased toward the agencies that have the unlimited
financial backing of the state. 1 In fact, the Judicial Review
144. See Amici Legislature and Director's Brief, supra note 50.
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amendment was enacted, in part, to remedy this concern. 145 If such a
system were allowed, the argument is that agencies can tie up
regulated entities and individuals in court until they lose the financial
and emotional will to continue to press their case. This is certainly a
crucial concern; however, it is not necessary to deny agency-initiated
judicial review of final ALJ orders in order to sufficiently meet it.
This concern may be adequately addressed by providing procedural
safeguards monitoring the standards of review to be used by the
courts on judicial review.
With this in mind, this proposal advocates differing standards of
review for questions of fact, questions of law, and questions of
policy. A strict form of deference should be accorded to ALJ factual
decisions, as the ALJ is the ultimate trier of fact and has the
advantage of viewing the witnesses' demeanor during cross-
examination. Thus, agencies should not be able to easily or
successfully contest ALJ factual decisions, unless the ALJ has
committed manifest error. On the other hand, less deference should
be accorded to ALJ decisions of law as the ALJ has no advantage
over the court regarding such decisions. As wisely noted by Judge
Dennis, "Article V courts must review all questions of law decided
by non-Article V tribunals."'
146
Finally, on issues of policy, political accountability must be taken
into account. Since the ALJs in the DAL are appointed by the
Director of the DAL, who is appointed by the Governor of
Louisiana, 47 neither the ALJs themselves, nor the DAL as an entity,
is politically accountable to the citizens of Louisiana. However, since
the agency head of the Department of Insurance is duly elected by the
citizens of Louisiana, 148 the COI is politically accountable for his or
her policy decisions.
As urged by Professor Rossi, "the political accountability of
agency heads is important to ensuring the public legitimacy of
145. See text accompanying Section II(A)(2), supra.
146. See Judge Dennis, Judicial Power, supra note 96, at 93. The term "Non-
Article V" tribunals typically refers to administrative agencies. However, since
adjudications in Louisiana have been transferred to the central panel, the DAL, this
term also applies to ALJs in the DAL.
147. See La. R.S. 49:995 (2003).
148. La. Const. art. IV, § 3.
agency action." 149 Therefore, when courts review issues of policy
decided by an ALJ, "the agency's reasoning framework should trump
the AL's reasoning, or that of any competing expert witness."' 5 ° Just
as strong deference should be accorded to ALJ findings of fact,
strong deference also should be accorded to the reasoning of
politically accountable agencies on issues of policy. The public has
the power to hold agencies politically accountable for their policy
decisions. The same is not true of politically insulated ALJs.
In practice, application of these principles is more daunting than
theory may suggest. More often than not, the usual administrative
adjudication handled by an ALJ involves mixed questions of law,
fact and policy. Sometimes it is very difficult to separate these three.
In such a case, the court must engage in a de novo review of the
matter while balancing the AL's advantage of viewing the
witnesses' demeanor under cross-examination with the agency's
advantages of expertise and political accountability. After all,
"agencies are often immersed in administering a particular statute.
Such specialization gives those agencies an intimate knowledge of
the problems dealt with in the statute and the various administrative
consequences arising from particular interpretations."15
One major criticism of this proposal could be that such a system
is inefficient for administrative adjudications, as well as for Article V
courts. However, a little inefficiency is a small price to pay to
preserve our constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. This
proposal requires more work than the current system, but it will be
well worth it for Louisiana to have a constitutionally sound, cutting
edge APA to which other states, and even the federal APA, might
look for direction in amending their APAs. Louisiana should no
longer substitute efficiency for fundamental constitutional principles.
B. Follow North Carolina's Lead in Striking an Appropriate
Balance
In case the legislature is wary of allowing agency-initiated
149. See Rossi, Final, But Often Fallible, supra note 1, at 71.
150. Id.
151. Michael Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of
California Administrative Agencies, 42 UCLA L. Rev. 1157, 1196 (1995).
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judicial review, the second proposal is to follow North Carolina's
lead in striking an appropriate balance between the competing
interests at stake. This proposal is consistent with the traditional
system of ALJs recommending decisions to the agencies, who make
the final decision. This proposal will not work properly in a system
of AU finality. Even though North Carolina had the opportunity to
institute AU finality in its APA, the General Assembly chose
another course. Agencies retain the right to make the final decision
on administrative adjudications; however, if the agency overturns the
AU's decision, the agency's decision will be subject to de novo
review by the courts on judicial review.
This approach respects both sides of the debate in that neither the
agencies, nor the ALJs are completely cut out of the process. An
important advantage of this approach is that it is familiar because the
first part of this process is similar to the traditional federal APA,
which allows hearing officers or ALJs to make a recommended
decision prior to the agency's final decision.' 52 At the same time, this
approach utilizes the courts to resolve disagreements between
agencies and ALJs, which properly protects the judiciary's check on
the executive branch.
One undeniable criticism of this approach is that in situations
where the agency disagrees with the AL's decision, the courts are
merely substituting their judgment while completely ignoring the
AU's advantage of viewing the witnesses' demeanor under cross-
examination and the agencies' advantages of expertise and political
accountability. These advantages are ignored because no deference is
due in a de novo review, which occurs when the agency disagrees
with the AU in North Carolina's APA.
Yet this criticism is easily overcome by applying the same
standards of review for issues of fact, law and policy as suggested in
the first proposal. The AU's recommended decision should be given
strong deference on issues of fact; whereas less deference should be
accorded ALJ decisions of law. Where there is an issue of law or of
policy, the agency's final decision should be given strong deference.
Finally, in cases where there are mixed issues, the court should
review the matter de novo, as already provided in North Carolina's
APA, while being mindful of the respective advantages of both the
152. See text accompanying Section I(A), supra.
ALJ and the agency. Either proposal will render a sophisticated and
constitutionally sound APA for Louisiana.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Wooley, the Louisiana Supreme Court faced the issue of
whether an explicit denial of agency-initiated judicial review in a
system of ALJ finality comports with the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers. Even though the court answered this issue in
the affirmative, the correct finding would conclude that such a denial
is an unconstitutional infringement on the judicial branch in that a
crucial check on the executive is obliterated, which leads to an
impermissible divestiture of the appellate jurisdiction of Article V
courts and a deprivation of the judiciary's inherent authority to
decide questions of law. This denial is also an unconstitutional
infringement on the executive branch in that the executive COI is
stripped of his core function of protecting the public interest.
It is quite remarkable that this debate was foreshadowed merely
one year prior to Louisiana's passage of the Judicial Review
amendment by two authors with their "not yet thoroughly baked
idea," as they described it.' 53 Judge McCowan and Ms. Leo opined
"why not give the agency the same right as other parties in a
contested case: the right of appeal of the decision to court?" 54 They
wisely reasoned "now that agency authority is limited, perhaps the
agency should have a right to appeal."' 155 This idea came about in
response to a more limited APA system that focused on balancing the
needs of both the agencies and ALJs, much like North Carolina's
APA.156 This argument in favor of agency-initiated judicial review is
only strengthened when analyzing Louisiana's system, which
completely cuts agencies out of the decision and policy making
process.
Despite the outcome in Wooley, the legislature must revisit this
153. F. Scott McCowan and Monica Leo, When Can an Agency Change the
Findings or Conclusions of an Administrative Law Judge?, 50 Baylor L. Rev. 65,
90 (1998). See also Amicus Baier, supra note 28, at 14.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Id. generally.
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issue with more sensitivity to the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers. It is the contention of this comment that the best avenue
for Louisiana lies in retaining ALJ finality, allowing agency-initiated
judicial review of adverse ALJ decisions, and requiring the courts to
apply the differing standards of review with respect to issues of fact,
law, and policy. If the Legislature decides against retaining the
current system of ALJ finality, the best alternative is to strike an
appropriate balance between the agencies and the ALJs much like
North Carolina has done. Only then will Louisiana truly be on the
cutting edge of the modem administrative state, and ALJs will no
longer rule the world of administrative law in Louisiana.
Inherent constitutional principles must no longer be surrendered
for the sake of efficiency. As Chief Justice Burger so eloquently
stated when analyzing the separation of powers between Congress
and federal agencies, "the fact that a given law or procedure is
efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the
Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary
objectives - or the hallmarks - of democratic government." 15
7
157. INSv. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983).
